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Background: Cognitive models propose that cognitive and
emotional processes, in the context of anomalies of expe-
rience, lead to and maintain delusions. No large-scale stud-
ies have investigated whether persecutory and grandiose
delusions reflect differing contributions of reasoning and
affective processes. This is complicated by their frequent
cooccurrence in schizophrenia. We hypothesized that
persecutory and grandiose subtypes would differ signifi-
cantly in their associations with psychological processes.
Methods: Participants were the 301 patients from the
Psychological Prevention of Relapse in Psychosis Trial
(ISRCTN83557988). Persecutory delusions were present
in 192 participants, and grandiose delusions were present
in 97, while 58 were rated as having delusions both of
persecution and grandiosity. Measures of emotional and
reasoning processes, at baseline only, were employed.
Results: A bivariate response model was used. Negative
self-evaluations and depression and anxiety predicted a sig-
nificantly increased chance of persecutory delusions
whereas grandiose delusions were predicted by less negative
self-evaluations and lower anxiety and depression, along
with higher positive self and positive other evaluations.
Reasoning biases were common in the whole group and
in categorically defined subgroups with only persecutory
delusions and only grandiose delusions; however, jumping
to conclusions, and belief flexibility were significantly dif-
ferent in the 2 groups, the grandiose group having a higher
likelihood of showing a reasoning bias than the persecutory
group. Conclusion: The significant differences in the pro-
cesses associated with these 2 delusion subtypes have impli-
cations for etiology and for the development of targeted
treatment strategies.
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Introduction
It is increasingly recognized that psychosis is complex
and multifactorial in origin, resulting from a number
of interacting biological, psychological, and social fac-
tors.1 Recent cognitive models of positive psychotic
symptoms accept the importance of biological processes
but emphasize the contribution of psychological mecha-
nisms, involving emotional and reasoning processes, to
the development and persistence of psychosis.1–4
However, delusions vary in content, and different types
of delusions may reflect distinct psychological processes.
Factor analyses of delusions separate persecutory delu-
sions from grandiose delusions, eg, refs.,5,6 and there is
evidence of distinct correlates.7 Persecutory delusions
are the most common type of delusion in schizophrenia,
affecting about 80%,8 and receive the most theoretical
and empirical attention, eg, refs.4,8 However, grandiose
delusions are also common in schizophrenia, present in
perhaps 25%–50% of people with the diagnosis.9 These
2 delusional subtypes should therefore cooccur in people
with a diagnosis of schizophrenia spectrum psychosis,
and only 10%–16% experience grandiose delusions in iso-
lation.9 Such cooccurrence makes it difficult to disentan-
gle individual effects,10 and this may result in processes
associated with one type of delusion being incorrectly
attributed to another.
As predicted by cognitive models, changes in affect and
reasoning are linked to paranoia. Thus paranoia is asso-
ciated with negative emotional states and negative cogni-
tions (low self-esteem, self-critical thinking, and extreme
negative beliefs about self and others, eg,4,8,11). There is
also evidence that disturbed reasoning, in particular the
data gathering bias, ‘‘jumping to conclusions’’ (JTC), is
associated with paranoia and with persecutory delu-
sions.4,8,12–14 ‘‘Belief flexibility’’ is a reasoning process
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related to JTC. It comprises 3 components—accepting
the possibility of being mistaken (PM), identifying an
alternative explanation (AE) of experiences to the delu-
sional belief (AE), and changing conviction in response to
an imagined contradictory scenario (reaction to hypothet-
ical contradiction, RTHC).13–16 There is initial evidence
that belief flexibility is impaired in paranoia.8,15,16
Some authors have proposed that grandiose delusions
result directly frommood-congruent mood disorder, spe-
cifically mania, eg,17,18 while others suggest that they
arise from the individual’s attempts to defend against
negative emotional states, eg, Neale19 (the ‘‘delusions as
defence’’ account). However, while manic affect may be
associated with the onset of grandiose delusions, there is
little to suggest a subsequent role in maintenance.9 Gran-
diose delusional beliefs appear to be associated with a re-
duced exposure to loss events, high self-esteem, and low
levels of depression and of negative self-schemas.20–22
One study, using experience sampling in people with
schizophrenia, found that negative emotional states pre-
dicted persecutory but not grandiose delusions.23,24
There have been few studies of cognition specifically in
relation to grandiose delusions. Jolley et al25 found that
patients with grandiose delusions and a diagnosis of
schizophrenia showed externalizing and self-serving attri-
butional biases, in contrast to the opposite ‘‘depressive’’
cognitive style associated with persecutory delusions.
There is evidence for a specific association between gran-
diose delusions and JTC,26 although it is currently in-
conclusive.24 Appelbaum and colleagues7 found that
grandiose delusions were associated with the highest levels
of conviction, which may indirectly suggest an association
with these reasoning biases.
The literature therefore suggests that the 2 subtypes of
delusion might relate differently to emotional processes,
specifically mood states, self-esteem and extreme evalua-
tions of self and others. It appears that the content is gen-
erally mood-congruent in both types of delusions, and
they are apparently distinguished by relationships of op-
posite directions. JTC and impaired belief flexibility do
seem to cooccur with both grandiose and persecutory
delusions, but the question of whether there are distin-
guishable patterns of relationship remains open. Clarify-
ing these issues should inform both etiological theories
and treatment, assisting the development of targeted
interventions.
The Current Study
The present study reports the first test of hypotheses
about reasoning and emotional processes in relation to
persecutory and grandiose delusions. It is based on a large
sample of people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia spec-
trum disorder, the 301 participants in the Psychological
Prevention of Relapse in Psychosis (PRP) trial (ISRCTN
83557988).27 As persecutory and grandiose delusions com-
monly cooccur, we used a method of analysis (bivariate
logistic regression) capable of tackling this cooccurrence.
Our previous research in this area was restricted to the sep-
arate examination of aspects of reasoning and emotional
processes and, with one exception,11 was based on a much
smaller sample, the first 100 participants in the
trial.14,16,22,25,28 The analyses presented here were designed
before the collection of data in the knowledge that they
would require the whole dataset to provide the necessary
statistical power.
1. We hypothesized that persecutory and grandiose delu-
sions will significantly differ in their associations with
emotional states (depression and anxiety) and with
self-esteem and evaluations of self and others; specif-
ically, paranoid delusions would be associated with de-
pression and negative self-schemas, whereas grandiose
delusions would be associated with positive self and
other schemas.
2. We also tested the hypothesis that persecutory and
grandiose delusions will significantly differ in their
associations with reasoning biases (JTC and belief
flexibility), in that grandiose delusions would be
more strongly associated with JTC and poorer belief
flexibility.
In addition to testing these specific hypotheses, we in-
vestigated whether the severity of psychosis, the level of
delusional conviction, and the presence of hallucinations
differed by delusion subtype.
Method
Participants
The study sample comprised the 301 patients from the
PRP Trial (ISRCTN83557988), a UK multicentre ran-
domized controlled trial of cognitive behavior therapy
and family intervention for psychosis,27 designed to an-
swer questions both about outcome and the psycholog-
ical processes associated with psychosis. Inclusion
criteria were a current diagnosis of nonaffective psychosis
(schizophrenia, schizoaffective psychosis, and delusional
disorder), age 18–65 years, a second or subsequent epi-
sode starting not more than 3 months before consent
to enter the trial, and a rating of at least 4 (moderate se-
verity) on at least one positive psychotic symptom in
the Positive andNegative Syndrome Scale (PANSS).29 Ex-
clusion criteria were a primary diagnosis of alcohol or sub-
stance dependency, organic syndrome or learning
disability, an inadequate command of English, and unsta-
ble residential arrangements. This report uses the symp-
tom and psychological assessments carried out at baseline.
Seventy percent of the total PRP sample was male
(mean age 37.6 y). Seventy-two percent described them-
selves as White-British, 8% as Black-Caribbean, 9% as
Black-African, and 11% as from other ethnic back-
grounds. Two hundred and fifty-seven (85%) had
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a diagnosis of schizophrenia, 40 (13%) of schizoaffective
disorder, and 4 (2%) of delusional disorder. The mean
length of illness was 10.7 years.
Procedure
After providing written informed consent, participants
were administered the measures for the current study,
while clinical and demographic data were taken from
medical notes (age, gender, self-reported ethnicity, and
illness length in years). Diagnoses and presence of specific
positive symptoms were established using a clinical diag-
nostic interview, the Schedules for Clinical Assessment in
Neuropsychiatry (SCAN),30 undertaken by fully trained
research assessors, who had high levels of interrater
reliability.27
Measures
Positive Symptom Measures. Scale for the assessment of
positive symptoms The Scale for the Assessment of Pos-
itive Symptoms (SAPS)31 is a 35-item 6-point (0–5) rating
instrument. Symptoms are rated over the last month. Per-
secutory or grandiose delusions were defined as present if
a response to item 8 (persecutory delusions) or item 11
(grandiose delusions) of between 2 (mild) and 5 (severe),
inclusive, was endorsed. Persecutory or grandiose delu-
sions were defined as absent if a response of 0 was en-
dorsed. If 1 (questionable) was endorsed, the presence
or absence of the delusion type could not be confirmed.
Positive and negative syndrome scale The PANSS is
a 30-item 7-point (1–7) rating instrument of the phenom-
ena associated with schizophrenia. Symptoms are rated
over the last 72 hours. The PANSS positive scale score
was used in the analysis.
Psychotic symptom rating scales—delusions subscale
This is a 6-item 5-point multidimensional measure of delu-
sions.32 We used the conviction item, scores dichotomized
at <50% and > 50%.
Scales for assessment in neuropsychiatry Verbal audi-
tory hallucinations were defined as present if a response
of 1 (rarely) to 4 (nearly continuously) was endorsed
on SCAN item 17.4 (frequency of verbal auditory
hallucinations).
Measures ofEmotionandReasoning.Brief core schema sca-
les The Brief Core Schema Scales (BCSS)28 is a 24-item
5-point self-report rating scale (0–4) assessing evaluative
beliefs about the self and others. Four scores are
obtained: negative self (6 items), positive self (6 items),
negative others (6 items), and positive others (6 items).
The BCSS has good reliability and internal consistency,
with Cronbach’s a coefficients > .78. Principal compo-
nents analysis revealed a 4-component solution (consis-
tent with the 4 subscale scores), accounting for 57% of
the variance.
Beck depression inventory The Beck Depression In-
ventory (BDI-II)33 is a 21-item self-report scale rated
on a 4-point scale (0–3) of increasing severity, designed
to assess symptoms of depression occurring over the
past 2 weeks. It has good psychometric properties and
has been used inmany studieswith patients with psychosis.
We used the total score.
The Rosenberg self-esteem scale The Rosenberg Self-
Esteem Scale (RSES)34 is a widely used, validated, self-
report 10 item 4-point scale (1–4) that assesses current
levels of global self-esteem. We used the total score.
Beck anxiety inventory The Beck Anxiety Inventory
(BAI)35 is a self-report 21-item 4-point scale (0–3) for
the assessment of anxiety. Anxiety is assessed over the
previous week. We used the total score.
JTC—probabilistic reasoning tasks We employed 3
probabilistic reasoning tasks, as previously described.14
Two neutral tasks (versions of the beads task) utilized
colored beads in an 85:15 or 60:40 ratio. Participants
were shown 2 jars containing equal and opposite propor-
tions of 2 colors of beads. The jars were hidden from view
and beads drawn, one at a time, from just one of the jars.
The task-required participants to decide which of the 2
jars had been chosen. In the third task, participants
were shown positive and negative words in a 60:40 ratio,
ostensibly drawn from a survey of 100 people describing
an individual (salient words task). Each task included
a memory aid, in which the previous items drawn are
shown. We conducted analyses based on a categorical
definition of JTC, identified by coming to a decision after
seeing fewer than 3 beads.13,14
Reasoning/belief flexibility: Maudsley assessment of
delusions and the explanations of experiencesmeasure The
Maudsley Assessment of Delusions (MADS)36 is a semi-
structured interview assessing the cognitive, affective, and
behavioral components of delusions and self-reported ev-
idence for delusions (internal and external events including
hallucinations and other anomalous experiences). The
MADS has good interrater reliability (mean j = 0.82).
The belief maintenance section of the MADS enquires
about the evidence for the delusion, and 2 of its items
have been used to measure aspects of belief flexibility
(the PM and the RTHC).14 The evidence for the delusion
cited by participants is sensitively discussed, and they are
asked whether it is at all possible for them to be mistaken
about their delusional belief. The interviewer then asks how
they would react in a hypothetical situation if some new
evidence were to be generated, which contradicts the delu-
sion. If they report that this would alter in any way their
level of belief, this is recorded as belief flexibility.
The Explanations of Experiences measure16 is a struc-
tured interview designed to assess whether people can en-
visage AE for the evidence cited for their delusion. Once the
evidence for the delusion is established, they are asked ‘‘Can
you think of any other explanations for the experiences that
you have described? Are there any other reasons—other
3
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related to JTC. It comprises 3 components—accepting
the possibility of being mistaken (PM), identifying an
alternative explanation (AE) of experiences to the delu-
sional belief (AE), and changing conviction in response to
an imagined contradictory scenario (reaction to hypothet-
ical contradiction, RTHC).13–16 There is initial evidence
that belief flexibility is impaired in paranoia.8,15,16
Some authors have proposed that grandiose delusions
result directly frommood-congruent mood disorder, spe-
cifically mania, eg,17,18 while others suggest that they
arise from the individual’s attempts to defend against
negative emotional states, eg, Neale19 (the ‘‘delusions as
defence’’ account). However, while manic affect may be
associated with the onset of grandiose delusions, there is
little to suggest a subsequent role in maintenance.9 Gran-
diose delusional beliefs appear to be associated with a re-
duced exposure to loss events, high self-esteem, and low
levels of depression and of negative self-schemas.20–22
One study, using experience sampling in people with
schizophrenia, found that negative emotional states pre-
dicted persecutory but not grandiose delusions.23,24
There have been few studies of cognition specifically in
relation to grandiose delusions. Jolley et al25 found that
patients with grandiose delusions and a diagnosis of
schizophrenia showed externalizing and self-serving attri-
butional biases, in contrast to the opposite ‘‘depressive’’
cognitive style associated with persecutory delusions.
There is evidence for a specific association between gran-
diose delusions and JTC,26 although it is currently in-
conclusive.24 Appelbaum and colleagues7 found that
grandiose delusions were associated with the highest levels
of conviction, which may indirectly suggest an association
with these reasoning biases.
The literature therefore suggests that the 2 subtypes of
delusion might relate differently to emotional processes,
specifically mood states, self-esteem and extreme evalua-
tions of self and others. It appears that the content is gen-
erally mood-congruent in both types of delusions, and
they are apparently distinguished by relationships of op-
posite directions. JTC and impaired belief flexibility do
seem to cooccur with both grandiose and persecutory
delusions, but the question of whether there are distin-
guishable patterns of relationship remains open. Clarify-
ing these issues should inform both etiological theories
and treatment, assisting the development of targeted
interventions.
The Current Study
The present study reports the first test of hypotheses
about reasoning and emotional processes in relation to
persecutory and grandiose delusions. It is based on a large
sample of people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia spec-
trum disorder, the 301 participants in the Psychological
Prevention of Relapse in Psychosis (PRP) trial (ISRCTN
83557988).27 As persecutory and grandiose delusions com-
monly cooccur, we used a method of analysis (bivariate
logistic regression) capable of tackling this cooccurrence.
Our previous research in this area was restricted to the sep-
arate examination of aspects of reasoning and emotional
processes and, with one exception,11 was based on a much
smaller sample, the first 100 participants in the
trial.14,16,22,25,28 The analyses presented here were designed
before the collection of data in the knowledge that they
would require the whole dataset to provide the necessary
statistical power.
1. We hypothesized that persecutory and grandiose delu-
sions will significantly differ in their associations with
emotional states (depression and anxiety) and with
self-esteem and evaluations of self and others; specif-
ically, paranoid delusions would be associated with de-
pression and negative self-schemas, whereas grandiose
delusions would be associated with positive self and
other schemas.
2. We also tested the hypothesis that persecutory and
grandiose delusions will significantly differ in their
associations with reasoning biases (JTC and belief
flexibility), in that grandiose delusions would be
more strongly associated with JTC and poorer belief
flexibility.
In addition to testing these specific hypotheses, we in-
vestigated whether the severity of psychosis, the level of
delusional conviction, and the presence of hallucinations
differed by delusion subtype.
Method
Participants
The study sample comprised the 301 patients from the
PRP Trial (ISRCTN83557988), a UK multicentre ran-
domized controlled trial of cognitive behavior therapy
and family intervention for psychosis,27 designed to an-
swer questions both about outcome and the psycholog-
ical processes associated with psychosis. Inclusion
criteria were a current diagnosis of nonaffective psychosis
(schizophrenia, schizoaffective psychosis, and delusional
disorder), age 18–65 years, a second or subsequent epi-
sode starting not more than 3 months before consent
to enter the trial, and a rating of at least 4 (moderate se-
verity) on at least one positive psychotic symptom in
the Positive andNegative Syndrome Scale (PANSS).29 Ex-
clusion criteria were a primary diagnosis of alcohol or sub-
stance dependency, organic syndrome or learning
disability, an inadequate command of English, and unsta-
ble residential arrangements. This report uses the symp-
tom and psychological assessments carried out at baseline.
Seventy percent of the total PRP sample was male
(mean age 37.6 y). Seventy-two percent described them-
selves as White-British, 8% as Black-Caribbean, 9% as
Black-African, and 11% as from other ethnic back-
grounds. Two hundred and fifty-seven (85%) had
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a diagnosis of schizophrenia, 40 (13%) of schizoaffective
disorder, and 4 (2%) of delusional disorder. The mean
length of illness was 10.7 years.
Procedure
After providing written informed consent, participants
were administered the measures for the current study,
while clinical and demographic data were taken from
medical notes (age, gender, self-reported ethnicity, and
illness length in years). Diagnoses and presence of specific
positive symptoms were established using a clinical diag-
nostic interview, the Schedules for Clinical Assessment in
Neuropsychiatry (SCAN),30 undertaken by fully trained
research assessors, who had high levels of interrater
reliability.27
Measures
Positive Symptom Measures. Scale for the assessment of
positive symptoms The Scale for the Assessment of Pos-
itive Symptoms (SAPS)31 is a 35-item 6-point (0–5) rating
instrument. Symptoms are rated over the last month. Per-
secutory or grandiose delusions were defined as present if
a response to item 8 (persecutory delusions) or item 11
(grandiose delusions) of between 2 (mild) and 5 (severe),
inclusive, was endorsed. Persecutory or grandiose delu-
sions were defined as absent if a response of 0 was en-
dorsed. If 1 (questionable) was endorsed, the presence
or absence of the delusion type could not be confirmed.
Positive and negative syndrome scale The PANSS is
a 30-item 7-point (1–7) rating instrument of the phenom-
ena associated with schizophrenia. Symptoms are rated
over the last 72 hours. The PANSS positive scale score
was used in the analysis.
Psychotic symptom rating scales—delusions subscale
This is a 6-item 5-point multidimensional measure of delu-
sions.32 We used the conviction item, scores dichotomized
at <50% and > 50%.
Scales for assessment in neuropsychiatry Verbal audi-
tory hallucinations were defined as present if a response
of 1 (rarely) to 4 (nearly continuously) was endorsed
on SCAN item 17.4 (frequency of verbal auditory
hallucinations).
Measures ofEmotionandReasoning.Brief core schema sca-
les The Brief Core Schema Scales (BCSS)28 is a 24-item
5-point self-report rating scale (0–4) assessing evaluative
beliefs about the self and others. Four scores are
obtained: negative self (6 items), positive self (6 items),
negative others (6 items), and positive others (6 items).
The BCSS has good reliability and internal consistency,
with Cronbach’s a coefficients > .78. Principal compo-
nents analysis revealed a 4-component solution (consis-
tent with the 4 subscale scores), accounting for 57% of
the variance.
Beck depression inventory The Beck Depression In-
ventory (BDI-II)33 is a 21-item self-report scale rated
on a 4-point scale (0–3) of increasing severity, designed
to assess symptoms of depression occurring over the
past 2 weeks. It has good psychometric properties and
has been used inmany studieswith patients with psychosis.
We used the total score.
The Rosenberg self-esteem scale The Rosenberg Self-
Esteem Scale (RSES)34 is a widely used, validated, self-
report 10 item 4-point scale (1–4) that assesses current
levels of global self-esteem. We used the total score.
Beck anxiety inventory The Beck Anxiety Inventory
(BAI)35 is a self-report 21-item 4-point scale (0–3) for
the assessment of anxiety. Anxiety is assessed over the
previous week. We used the total score.
JTC—probabilistic reasoning tasks We employed 3
probabilistic reasoning tasks, as previously described.14
Two neutral tasks (versions of the beads task) utilized
colored beads in an 85:15 or 60:40 ratio. Participants
were shown 2 jars containing equal and opposite propor-
tions of 2 colors of beads. The jars were hidden from view
and beads drawn, one at a time, from just one of the jars.
The task-required participants to decide which of the 2
jars had been chosen. In the third task, participants
were shown positive and negative words in a 60:40 ratio,
ostensibly drawn from a survey of 100 people describing
an individual (salient words task). Each task included
a memory aid, in which the previous items drawn are
shown. We conducted analyses based on a categorical
definition of JTC, identified by coming to a decision after
seeing fewer than 3 beads.13,14
Reasoning/belief flexibility: Maudsley assessment of
delusions and the explanations of experiencesmeasure The
Maudsley Assessment of Delusions (MADS)36 is a semi-
structured interview assessing the cognitive, affective, and
behavioral components of delusions and self-reported ev-
idence for delusions (internal and external events including
hallucinations and other anomalous experiences). The
MADS has good interrater reliability (mean j = 0.82).
The belief maintenance section of the MADS enquires
about the evidence for the delusion, and 2 of its items
have been used to measure aspects of belief flexibility
(the PM and the RTHC).14 The evidence for the delusion
cited by participants is sensitively discussed, and they are
asked whether it is at all possible for them to be mistaken
about their delusional belief. The interviewer then asks how
they would react in a hypothetical situation if some new
evidence were to be generated, which contradicts the delu-
sion. If they report that this would alter in any way their
level of belief, this is recorded as belief flexibility.
The Explanations of Experiences measure16 is a struc-
tured interview designed to assess whether people can en-
visage AE for the evidence cited for their delusion. Once the
evidence for the delusion is established, they are asked ‘‘Can
you think of any other explanations for the experiences that
you have described? Are there any other reasons—other
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than (the delusional belief)—that could possibly account
for these experiences even if you think they are very
unlikely?’’ The generation of any AE is also taken as
an indication of belief flexibility.
Analysis
Analyses were carried out using Stata version 11.37 We
first present descriptive data on the whole sample and dis-
play the cognitive and emotional variables in relation to
the presence and absence of persecutory and of grandiose
delusions. To examine our key hypotheses of differences
between persecutory and grandiose delusions in these
processes, we used a bivariate response (ie, repeated
measures) model,38 the aim being to test whether the
effect of a given predictor is the same on the 2 outcomes.
As in many repeated measures analyses, multiple records
(in this case, 2) were created for each participant, each
corresponding to the value of the within-subject variable
distinguishing the repeated measurements. In this case,
the binary indicator of persecutory delusions was the first
record, and the binary indicator of grandiose delusions
was the second. The name of the binary variable indicat-
ing the presence of delusions (irrespective of type),
‘‘Delusion,’’ was common to both records. A further
variable—awithin-subject factor (type) was created to in-
dicate whether the record corresponded to persecution
(type = 1) or to grandiosity (type = 2). Note that the
responses to both types can be 0 (absent) or 1 (present)—
giving 4 possibilities (both 0, 0 and 1, 1 and 0, and both 1)
but that the responses to the 2 types will be correlated.
This data structure (the ‘‘long’’ format in stata) is
more frequently encountered in a repeated measures
analysis where the with-subject factor is time rather
than the qualitative variable, type. The lack of indepen-
dence between within-subject observations is allowed for
by the participant’s ID.
Consider, for example, the predictive effect of Sex.
Ignoring possible confounders for simplicity, the Stata
command to be used, is the following:
logit delusion i.sex i.type i.sex 3 i.type, cluster (id)
This corresponds to what is called a marginal bivariate
logistic regression model, allowing for clustering (correla-
tion) arising through the ID variable. The command auto-
matically generates robust SEs, CIs, and corresponding
P values. Readers with experience of the more familiar
repeated measures analysis (involving time as the within-
subject factor) will realize that the key test is that for the
sex by type interaction (ie, is the effect of sex the same
for the 2 types of delusion?—or, in the analogous situation,
is the effect of an explanatory factor the same over time?).
We report the effects adjusted for potential con-
founding variables. Because unadjusted relationships
may be subject to bias by failing to take into account
confounding variables (covariates) associated with
both predictors and outcome, the presentation of the
adjusted effects is considered preferable. The covariates
determined a priori as clinically important predictors
were age, sex, ethnicity, belief flexibility (possibly mis-
taken), JTC (85–15); negative evaluations (negative
other); positive evaluations (positive other), BDI, and
BAI. Due to their considerable collinearity, the mood
variables (BDI and BAI) were removed as covariates
in favor of the negative and positive evaluation variables
(which also containedmore complete data). For each pre-
dictor, the adjusted model included the main effects of
each confounder and the predictor’s interaction with
type effect. All hypothesis testing was 2-tailed.
We also performed sensitivity analyses, in which we
repeated the bivariate logistic analysis twice. Initially,
we included all the predictors of interest as covariates
in the model. We then applied a principal component
regression in order to remove any collinearity present
within the clinical and nondemographic variables before
including them as covariates. The results were similar. As
in most large samples, there were variable amounts of
missing data. We used a complete-case analysis and
checked whether any demographic or clinical variables
were significant predictors of missing data; such predic-
tors turned out to have been flagged as covariates and
had already been included in the model.
Results
Presence of Delusion Types in the Whole Sample
Using SAPS ratings, persecutory delusions were rated
present in 192 of the 301 participants, while grandiose
delusions were present in 97 participants. Fifty-eight partic-
ipants were rated as having both persecutory and grandiose
delusions. There were no missing SAPS data.
Table 1 gives summary data on presence, absence, and
questionable ratings of persecutory and grandiose delu-
sions and on the presence of other delusion subtypes and
their cooccurrence with persecutory and grandiose delu-
sions (excluding ‘‘questionable’’ ratings). Thirty-two par-
ticipants were rated as having no delusions of any type
(inclusion in the PRP sample required at least one posi-
tive symptom, and these participants had hallucinations
only). One hundred and eighty-nine participants (65.4%)
were recorded as having verbal auditory hallucinations,
while 100 (34.6%) did not.
Clinical, Emotion, and Reasoning Processes in the Whole
Sample
Table 2 shows summary statistics for selected clinical,
emotion, and reasoning variables for the whole sample.
The sample, which was recruited within 3 months of
a psychotic relapse, had, on average, moderate levels
of positive and negative symptoms and mild-moderate
levels of depressed and anxious mood. They had low
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self-esteem and negative views of self and others, typical
of a psychosis group. As generally seen in psychosis,
approximately 40%–50% of the sample showed the JTC
reasoning bias and 50%–76% a lack of belief flexibility.
Grandiose and Persecutory Delusions and Emotional and
Reasoning Processes
The sample was then divided into 4 groups as follows:
persecutory delusions only (the ‘‘P-group’’: SAPS P rated
> 1 and G < 2), grandiose delusions only (the
‘‘G-group’’: SAPS G rated > 1 and P < 2), both perse-
cutory and grandiose delusions (the ‘‘P- and G-group’’:
both P andG> 1), and neither persecutory nor grandiose
delusions (the ‘‘neither group’’: both P and G = 0) (where
0 = absent. 1 = questionable. and 2 = present). Twenty-
one participants were excluded from these tables (and
our subsequent analyses) because we could not use their
delusion type data with confidence: they had either 2
questionable (1) ratings or a combination of a question-
able and an absent rating. The final sample is conse-
quently N = 280, with variable amounts of missing
data. Table 3 shows selected demographic and clinical
symptom data, and table 4 shows emotion-related and
reasoning variables.
Visual inspection of these tables suggests no clearly dif-
ferent associations between the 4 different groupings in ei-
ther demographic or clinical data (table 3). In table 4, the
P-group tended to score highest on negative emotion var-
iables, the G-group lowest, and the P and G-group falls
midway. The G-group had notably low, ie, better, self-
esteem scores (there are no formal cutoffs on the RSES)
and mean scores near to (or only just above) the cutoffs
(14/15) for clinical levels of depression and anxiety, respec-
tively.33,35 Reasoning biases were common in all groups,
but the pattern is less clear than for the emotion variables
(table 4).
Differences Between Persecutory and Grandiose
Delusions
The bivariate logistic regression analysis is the key test
of our hypotheses that persecutory and grandiose
Table 1. Delusion Subtypes in the Whole Sample (N = 301)
Present Absent Questionable Total
Persecutory 192 (64%) 85 (28%) 24 (8%) 301
Grandiose 97 (32%) 177 (59%) 27 (9%) 301
Persecutory Grandiose
Present % Absent % Present % Absent %
Jealousy (n = 7) 71 29 0 100
Guilt or sin (n = 38) 95 5 30 70
Religious (n = 56) 70 30 75 25
Somatic (n = 54) 80 20 38 62
Reference (n = 174) 84 16 43 57
Being controlled (n = 41) 75 25 34 66
Mind reading (n = 83) 82 18 43 5
Thought broadcast (n = 39) 69 31 41 59
Thought insertion (n = 46) 76 24 50 50
Thought withdrawal (n = 15) 67 33 46 54
Table 2. Clinical, Emotional, and Reasoning Variables in the
Whole Sample (n = 301)
Mean SD Range
Clinical
PANSS positive 18.15 5.33 7–36
PSYRATS conviction 2.71 1.47 0–4
PANSS negative 13.27 6.03 7–38
Emotional
BAI 19.86 14.22 0–63
BDI-II 22.12 13.11 0–58
RSES 23.54 6.43 10–40
Negative self 7.19 5.89 0–24
Positive self 10.15 6.48 0–24
Negative other 8.97 6.81 0–24
Positive other 10.43 6.13 0–24
JTC JTC n (%) Not JTC
n (%)
85:15 beads task 105 (51.5) 99 (48.5)
60:40 beads task 79 (39.3) 122 (60.7)





AE 49 (23.8) 157 (76.2)
RTHC 66 (32.2) 139 (67.8)
PM 110 (50.5) 108 (49.5)
Note: AE, alternative explanations; BAI, Beck Anxiety
Inventory; BDI-II, Beck Depression Inventory; BF, belief
flexibility; PANSS, Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale; PM,
possibility of being mistaken; PSYRATS, Psychotic Symptom
Rating Scales—Delusions Subscale; RSES, Rosenberg
Self-Esteem Scale; RTHC, reaction to hypothetical
contradiction; JTC, jumping to conclusions.
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than (the delusional belief)—that could possibly account
for these experiences even if you think they are very
unlikely?’’ The generation of any AE is also taken as
an indication of belief flexibility.
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delusions would differ significantly in their associations
with emotion and reasoning processes. Table 5 displays
the effects for each predictor, adjusted for the set of
potential confounders with adjusted ORs, P values
and 95% CIs for the interactions and corresponding
main effects.
In interpreting these results, note that, for continuous
scales, the ORs refer to 1-point changes; if the OR for
a unit change in the independent variable is, eg, 1.10,
then the OR for a 10-point increase is 1.10 raised to
the power of 10 (ie, 2.59). Alternatively, if the OR for
a 1-point increase in self-esteem score is 0.89, the OR
for a 10-point increase is 0.89 to the power of 10, ie,
0.31. For example, the adjusted effect for self-esteem is
significant (P < .001), and as self-esteem score increases
by 1-point (ie, toward poorer self-esteem), the odds in-
crease by 1.10 for persecutory delusions and reduce by
0.90 (1.10 3 0.82 = 0.90) for grandiose delusions. For
the categorical variables, the ORs are more easily inter-
preted. For example, for JTC 85-15, the adjusted odds of
showing the JTC bias is 0.31 in the persecutory group and
nearly 7.5 times greater at 2.29 (0.31 3 7.39 = 2.29) in the
grandiose group.
Nearly, all of the predicted emotion variables showed
highly significant effects in the hypothesized directions.
Negative self-evaluations and negative mood (depression
and anxiety) predicted an increased chance of persecu-
tory delusions. In contrast, grandiose delusions were pre-
dicted by less negative self-evaluations, and lower anxiety
and depression, along with higher positive self and pos-
itive other evaluations. The results for reasoning varia-
bles are less consistently strong. The effects of JTC
85-15, and the 3 belief flexibility variables (AE, PM,
and RTHC) were significantly different in the 2 groups
(P values < .001; .05, .03; and .03, respectively); in all
these cases, the grandiose group had a higher likelihood
of showing the reasoning bias than the persecutory group
(respectively, JTC 85:15 was 7.4 times more likely; AE,
6.6 times; PM, 4.5 times; and RTHC, 9 times more likely;
note that JTC and belief flexibility variables are scored in
opposite directions). However, 2 JTC measures, 60:40
beads and words, were not significantly different. Neither
of our measures of symptom severity showed significant
effects (PANSS positive score, Psychotic Symptom Rat-
ing Scales—Delusions Subscale [PSYRATS] conviction)
nor did the presence of hallucinations.










Male 91 31 48 31 201
Female 43 8 10 18 79
Ethnicity
White 96 32 46 31 205
Black-Caribbean 12 0 1 8 21
Black-African 10 6 4 5 25
Black-other 3 1 2 1 7
Indian 2 0 1 2 5
Other 11 0 4 2 17
Diagnosis
F20 schizophrenia 119 33 47 45 244
F22 delusional 1 0 1 0 2
Disorder
F25 schizoaffective disorder 14 6 10 4 34
Grandiose delusions
Absent 119 0 0 49 168
Present 0 39 58 0 97
Persecutory delusions
Absent 0 28 0 49 77
Present 134 0 58 0 192
n Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD
Age 134 37.68 11.05 39 39.33 10.47 58 38.48 11.97 49 34.92 9.76 280 37.59 10.98
PANSS positive 134 18.36 4.26 39 19.64 4.17 58 22.28 5.56 49 12.53 3.63 280 18.33 5.38
PSYRATS conviction 132 3.08 1.05 39 3.28 1.10 56 3.125 1.18 48 0.81 1.48 275 2.72 1.46
PANSS negative 134 13.74 6.20 39 12.46 5.81 58 11.24 4.25 49 14.39 6.82 280 13.16 5.99
Note: PANSS, Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale; PSYRATS, Psychotic Symptom Rating Scales—Delusions Subscale.
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Discussion
This is the first study to examine differences in the emo-
tional and cognitive processes characteristic of persecu-
tory and grandiose delusions in a large sample of
people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia spectrum psy-
chosis. Appropriate analysis must take account of the
fact, confirmed in our sample, that most patients with
grandiose delusions also have delusions of persecution.
Simple examination or separate regressions of the
mean scores of groups with one of these delusion types
(a commonly employed method) masks the effects of
the cooccurring delusion, especially when these are in
opposite directions. Comparing people with pure perse-
cutory and pure grandiose delusions has the further
limitation of comparing unusual and extreme groupings.
We therefore based our main analysis on bivariate logis-
tic regression, which permits the examination of the dif-
ferential prediction of delusion type in a single analysis.
The findings indicated clearly that there were signifi-
cant differences in the processes associated with these
2 delusion subtypes. As hypothesized, persecutory and
grandiose delusions were differentially associated with
emotional states and extreme evaluations of self and
others: the odds of delusions of persecution increased
with negative emotions, negative self and other evalua-
tions, and lower self-esteem, while the odds of grandiose
delusions increased with higher positive evaluations of
self and others and lower depression and anxiety.
The results concerning reasoning biases are novel and
intriguing. The findings, while less consistent than those
for the emotional variables, showed that grandiose delu-
sions were significantly more likely than persecutory
delusions to be associated with poor belief flexibility
and with JTC 85:15, with relative odds ranging from ap-
proximately 4.5 to 9 times higher. This has not previously
been shown and warrants further investigation and rep-
lication. If replicated, the findings would have important









n Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD
Emotional
BAI 124 23.19 13.76 35 14.43 13.51 53 18.08 12.65 46 17.07 14.9 258 19.86 14.05
BDI-II 130 25.52 12.95 39 16.31 10.25 54 18.91 12.76 49 21.73 12.93 272 22.2 12.98
RSES 118 25.64 5.91 32 18.97 5.53 52 21.83 5.92 43 23.72 6.4 245 23.62 6.37
Negative self 117 8.42 5.75 32 3.94 4.03 46 6.52 6.12 46 6.7 5.98 241 7.13 5.84
Positive self 115 7.9 5.54 31 13.77 6.81 46 12.54 5.6 46 11.09 7.08 238 10.18 6.44
Negative other 117 10.45 6.65 32 7.84 6.31 45 9.36 7.15 45 5.8 6.17 239 9.02 6.81
Positive other 115 9.23 5.87 31 11.48 6 45 11.11 5.96 44 12 6.85 235 10.41 6.17
Reasoning N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%)
JTC (85:15 beads task)
Not JTC 45 (52) 5 (20) 23 (50) 19 (54) 92 (48)
JTC 42 (48) 20 (80) 23 (50) 16 (46) 101 (52)
JTC (60:40 beads task)
Not JTC 53 (62) 13 (54) 28 (61) 22 (63) 116 (61)
JTC 32 (38) 11 (46) 18 (39) 13 (37) 74 (39)
JTC (word task)
Not JTC 50 (60) 14 (58) 31 (70) 22 (67) 117 (63)
JTC 34 (40) 10 (42) 13 (30) 11 (33) 68 (37)
AE
No alternatives 83 (75) 23 (79) 39 (78) 8 (89) 153 (77)




70 (64) 23 (74) 37 (76) 4 (57) 134 (68)
Change in
conviction
40 (36) 8 (26) 12 (24) 3 (43) 63 (32)
Possibly mistaken
No 48 (42) 16 (52) 33 (63) 5 (56) 102 (49)
Yes 67 (58) 15 (48) 19 (37) 4 (44) 105 (51)
Note: AE, alternative explanationsl BAI, Beck Anxiety Inventory; BDI-II, Beck Depression Inventory; JTC, jumping to conclusions;
RSES, Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale; RTHC, reaction to hypothetical contradiction.
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delusions would differ significantly in their associations
with emotion and reasoning processes. Table 5 displays
the effects for each predictor, adjusted for the set of
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and 95% CIs for the interactions and corresponding
main effects.
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nearly 7.5 times greater at 2.29 (0.31 3 7.39 = 2.29) in the
grandiose group.
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tory delusions. In contrast, grandiose delusions were pre-
dicted by less negative self-evaluations, and lower anxiety
and depression, along with higher positive self and pos-
itive other evaluations. The results for reasoning varia-
bles are less consistently strong. The effects of JTC
85-15, and the 3 belief flexibility variables (AE, PM,
and RTHC) were significantly different in the 2 groups
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these cases, the grandiose group had a higher likelihood
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(respectively, JTC 85:15 was 7.4 times more likely; AE,
6.6 times; PM, 4.5 times; and RTHC, 9 times more likely;
note that JTC and belief flexibility variables are scored in
opposite directions). However, 2 JTC measures, 60:40
beads and words, were not significantly different. Neither
of our measures of symptom severity showed significant
effects (PANSS positive score, Psychotic Symptom Rat-
ing Scales—Delusions Subscale [PSYRATS] conviction)
nor did the presence of hallucinations.
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Table 5. Bivariate Logistic Regression
Adjusted Effects
OR P Value CI
Clinical
PANSS positive 1.09 .12 0.98–1.21
Type 0.01 .01 0.00–0.35
Type 3 PANSS positive 1.14 .12 0.97–1.33
Psyrats conviction (>50%) 0.38 .44 0.03–4.30
Type 0.02 .007 0.01–0.36
Type 3 PSYRATS conviction 7.07 .17 0.44–112.7
Auditory hallucinations (present) 1.12 .84 0.38–3.25
Type 0.16 .002 0.05–0.52
Type 3 auditory hallucinations 0.75 .7 0.17–3.24
Emotional
BAI 1.07 .003 1.02–1.12
Type 0.83 .76 0.25–2.72
Type 3 BAI 0.92 .003** 0.86–0.97
BDI-II 1.04 .04 1.00–1.08
Type 1.45 .59 0.38–5.51
Type 3 BDI-II 0.91 .000*** 0.86–0.96
RSES 1.1 .02 1.01–1.20
Type 19.43 .03 1.27–297.3
Type 3 self-esteem 0.82 .000*** 0.73–0.91
Negative self 1.18 .009 1.04–1.35
Type 0.74 .6 0.25–2.24
Type 3 negative self 0.79 .001*** 0.68–0.91
Positive self 0.93 .07 0.86–1.01
Type 0.02 0.01–0.07
Type 3 positive self 1.26 .000*** 1.11–1.42
Negative other 1.07 .07 0.99–1.15
Type 0.26 .03 0.08–0.86
Type 3 negative other 0.94 .25 0.85–1.04
Positive other 0.95 .23 0.86–1.04
Type 0.04 0.01–0.17
Type 3 positive other 1.14 .03* 1.01–1.29
Reasoning
85:15 beads task (JTC) 0.31 .04 0.10–0.94
Type 0.05 0.02–0.13
Type 3 85:15 beads task 7.39 .004** 1.87–29.3
60:40 beads task (JTC) 1.5 .46 0.51–4.43
Type 0.15 0.06–0.35
Type 3 60:40 beads task 1.04 .96 0.23–4.62
Words task (JTC) 0.76 .59 0.27–2.08
Type 0.13 0.05–0.33
Type 3 JTC words 1.41 .65 0.32–6.19
AE (alternatives) 3.66 .1 0.78–17.2
Type 0.19 0.09–0.43
Type 3 AE 0.15 .05* 0.02–1.01
RTHC (change) 3.33 .15 0.64–17.2
Type 0.24 .001 0.10–0.54
Type 3 hypothetical contradictions 0.11 .03* 0.02–0.82
Possibly mistaken (yes) 1.73 .29 0.63–4.71
Type 0.3 .009 0.12–0.73
Type 3 possibly mistaken 0.22 .04* 0.05–0.91
Note: AE, alternative explanations; BAI, Beck Anxiety Inventory, BDI-II, Beck Depression Inventory; PANSS, Positive and Negative
Syndrome Scale; PSYRATS, Psychotic Symptom Rating Scales—Delusions Subscale; RSES, Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, RTHC,
reaction to hypothetical contradiction; JTC, jumping to conclusions.
*P  .05, ** P  .01, *** P  .001
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implications for etiological theories of grandiose delu-
sions and for treatment. It is not clear why these findings
relate to only 1 of our 3 indicators of JTC.We know from
other analyses of the PRP sample, that the 3 indicators
are related and form 1 clear factor.13,14
The absence of any other symptomatic differences is
also of interest. The differences found here between per-
secutory and grandiose delusions therefore cannot be
attributed to differential influences of auditory hallucina-
tions, levels of delusional conviction, or overall positive
symptom severity.
Our results are consistent with the increasing weight of
evidence for the role of negative emotion and negative
self-concept in persecutory delusions.4,11 However, our
finding that reasoning biases are less prominent in perse-
cutory than in grandiose delusions has not been previ-
ously shown. This should not, however, be taken to
imply that they do not apply at all to persecutory delu-
sions—table 4 is instructive: it shows that about 50% of
the sample with persecutory delusions only (P-Group)
jumped to conclusions on the 85:15 task, and appreciable
proportions showed poor belief flexibility. Grandiose
delusions were characteristically associated with less neg-
ative emotions and amore positive self-concept, also sup-
porting the emotion-consistent model discussed above.9
However, they were more likely than persecutory delu-
sions to be associated with reasoning biases, suggesting
etiological differences between these delusion types.
The absence of differences in conviction suggested that
this factor does not account for the observed differences.
There is currently no theoretical model of grandiose
delusions, which adequately addresses reasoning pro-
cesses. We tentatively speculate that, in the absence of de-
pressed affect and a negative self-concept, the aberrant
experiences of psychosis are more likely to be appraised
as personally significant and to acquire grandiose (posi-
tive) content when a person’s style of reasoning shows
a tendency to adopt an explanation of events and expe-
riences on the basis of limited data and with limited gen-
eration of AE or review of evidence. It is apparent that
there is a need for the development of a more elaborate
model of grandiose delusions, incorporating both reason-
ing and emotional processes. This should then be tested in
empirical studies.
The present study had some limitations. First, we chose
to focus on the processes associated with 2 common delu-
sions and in doing so, we have not been able to consider
other cooccurring delusion subtypes. These are many and
various, as show in table 1 (though in relatively small
numbers), and we do not know how each subtype con-
tributes to this emerging picture. Secondly, we set
a low threshold for including the presence of grandiose
and persecutory delusions. Thus we included ratings of
mild delusions (scoring 2 on the SAPS), (although the
mean PSYRATS conviction scores indicate that, in gen-
eral, the group had high conviction). This was because
we were interested in testing for associations with the
occurrence, rather than with the severity, of delusion
type. Thirdly, this was a cross-sectional study, which can-
not identify the direction of effects. Fourthly, the analysis
involved multiple testing because we wished to examine
a number of measures in a single study; the reasoning
results should therefore be treated with some caution,
particularly those with P values nearing .05. It is impor-
tant that these findings be replicated in a large indepen-
dent sample. Finally, there were missing data, in varying
amounts for eachmeasure.We took account of this in the
analysis, and for the bivariate logistic regression, we were
able to conduct a complete-case analysis, minimizing, as
far as possible, the effect of missing data.
Our findings have significant clinical implications. The
importance of emotional processes specific to these delu-
sion types is clear and in line with recent work on devel-
oping psychological treatments for paranoia.39 Our
results suggest a need for further theoretical development
and treatment innovation on emotion-congruent pro-
cesses for both types of delusion.8,9 However, the reason-
ing results suggest a new emphasis. For people with
grandiose delusions, it is recognized that psychological
therapy may be especially challenging because of the
positive mood and self-esteem associated with these delu-
sions and the consequently low motivation for change.
Our findings further indicate that important reasoning
biases may go under recognized. The reasoning biases
of JTC and belief flexibility are relatively difficult to
change, and work is underway to develop more targeted
therapeutic approaches, eg, refs.15,40 There is a clear need
to develop and tailor therapeutic strategies more specif-
ically to these delusion subtypes and their associated
emotional and reasoning biases.
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